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THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SANDRA 
DAY O’CONNOR:  A REFUSAL TO “FORECLOSE THE 
UNANTICIPATED” 
Wilson Ray Huhn* 
I would not foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a 
single mode of historical analysis.1 
 Sandra Day O’Connor 
 
Earlier this year, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor retired from the 
Supreme Court of the United States after 25 years of service.2  It would 
be difficult to overstate the impact that Justice O’Connor has had on the 
interpretation of the Constitution during her tenure on the Court.  Her 
importance to the development of American constitutional law stems 
from her central position on the Supreme Court.  Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky has described her role in these terms: 
O’Connor is in control. In virtually every area of constitutional law, 
her key fifth vote determines what will be the majority’s position and 
what will be the dissent. Lawyers who argue and write briefs to the 
Court know they are, for all practical purposes, arguing to an audience 
of one.3 
In order to understand the influence that Justice O’Connor has 
wielded within the Court and in order to appreciate the specific 
 
*  B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr., Professor of 
Law, University of Akron School of Law. 
         1.    Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989).  
         2.    See O’Connor Slips Into Retirement, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, February 1, 2006 at A14.  
Twenty-five years ago, President Ronald Reagan made history when he nominated 
Sandra Day O'Connor to be the nation's first female Supreme Court justice. On the court, 
as the deciding vote in some of its most closely watched cases, she was sometimes called 
the most powerful woman in America. [On January 31, 2006], with little of the fanfare 
that marked her Supreme Court rise, O'Connor, 75, ended her tenure. 
Id. 
 3. Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice O’Connor and Federalism, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 877, 877 
(2001). 
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contributions that she has made to American law, it is appropriate to 
examine her judicial philosophy and to review the substantive principles 
that she has helped to create.  The purpose of this essay is to briefly 
summarize the jurisprudence of Justice O’Connor in the field of 
Constitutional Law.4 
Over the course of her term on the Supreme Court of the United 
States, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has progressed from being a 
diligent and competent legal technician to becoming one of the leading 
expositors of the Constitution.  In her early years on the Court, Justice 
O’Connor was frequently concerned with legal technicalities such as 
procedural barriers to access to the Court, but by the end of her career 
she had confronted and dealt with the most important questions of law 
that face us as a Nation.  Over time she became an eloquent author of 
judicial opinions expressing fundamental truths about American values 
in clear, concise language that will stand the test of time.  Justice 
O’Connor has been faithful to precedent and attentive to detail, while at 
the same time demonstrating a constant willingness to rethink her 
position on matters of fundamental importance.  Beyond her 
contributions to our understanding of the Constitution, Sandra Day 
O’Connor has also enlarged our understanding of human potential.  Her 
most enduring lesson for us all is that throughout all stages of life we are 
capable of remarkable growth. 
Part I of this essay covers an early period on the Court when Justice 
O’Connor seemed principally concerned with questions of jurisdiction 
and appellate process, during which she was frequently inclined to 
dispose of cases on technical or procedural grounds.  Part II discusses 
Justice O’Connor’s attention to detail and consideration of factual 
context and her tendency to adjust the traditional standards of review in 
light of the circumstances of the case.  Part III outlines Justice 
O’Connor’s respect for precedent and commitment to the principle of 
stare decisis particularly as it relates to her refusal to overrule Roe v. 
Wade.5  Part IV describes how her judicial philosophy evolved during 
her tenure on the Court to the point where she achieved a deep 
understanding and formulated a nuanced articulation of the fundamental 
American values embodied by the Constitution. 
 
 4. This essay is largely confined to examining the civil law aspects of Justice O’Connor’s 
constitutional jurisprudence, including decisions under the Commerce Clause, First Amendment, 
Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause.  It does not address her writings on the criminal 
law aspects of Constitutional Law, such as decisions interpreting the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments. 
 5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing woman’s constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy). 
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I.  EARLY OPINIONS 
Justice O’Connor ascended to the high court in 1981, and the 
opinions she wrote during the first few years of her tenure frequently 
dismissed constitutional claims on jurisdictional or procedural grounds.  
For example, in I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza,6 when the respondent 
appealed a ruling ordering his deportation on the ground that an 
unlawfully obtained admission had been admitted at his deportation 
hearing, Justice O’Connor dismissed his claim on the ground that he 
failed to make the proper objection in the administrative proceeding.  
Specifically, she ruled that the respondent’s motion to dismiss the 
proceeding on the ground that he had been the subject of an unlawful 
arrest could not be construed as an objection to the admission of his 
statement that was unlawfully obtained as a result of that arrest.7  Justice 
O’Connor focused on minutiae in support of her position that the Court 
of Appeals had erred in reaching the merits of the respondent’s 
constitutional claim.  For example, she took pains to point out, and 
apparently found it significant, that the Court of Appeals had changed 
the wording of a footnote in its opinion between the time that it issued 
the slip opinion and the time that the lower court opinion was bound.8  
Justice O’Connor characterized this passage as “an apparently unsettled 
footnote of [the lower court’s] decision,”9 and reversed the decision of 
the Court of Appeals on the procedural point that was discussed in the 
footnote.10 
In Allen v. Wright11 the Court considered a claim brought by 
African-American parents challenging the unlawful action of the Internal 
Revenue Service in extending tax-exempt status to racially 
discriminatory schools in clear violation of the mandate of federal law.12  
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice O’Connor dismissed the case 
on the ground that the parents lacked standing.13  Even though the 
dissent cited compelling evidence that these racially segregated 
 
 6. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (dismissing respondents’ claims challenging the constitutionality of 
their deportation proceedings). 
 7. See id. at 1040 (O’Connor, J.) (“At his deportation hearing Lopez-Mendoza objected only 
to the fact that he had been summoned to a deportation hearing following an unlawful arrest; he 
entered no objection to the evidence offered against him.”). 
 8. See id. at 1040 n.1. 
 9. Id.  
 10. See id.  
 11. 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (dismissing civil rights claim for lack of standing). 
 12. See id. at 739-40 (O’Connor, J.) (summarizing facts of case and nature of the claim). 
 13. See id. at 740 (“The issue before us is whether plaintiffs have standing to bring this suit. 
We hold that they do not.”). 
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academies were causing the local public schools to become 
resegregated,14 Justice O’Connor concluded that there was insufficient 
evidence that the actions of the Internal Revenue Service had in fact 
caused the flight of white children from the public schools.15  
Accordingly, Justice O’Connor dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.16 
Engle v. Isaac17 is another early case of O’Connor’s in which she 
disposed of a constitutional claim on technical grounds.  In that case, the 
criminal defendants claimed that under the Due Process Clause the State 
bore the burden of proving that the defendants had not acted in self-
defense.18  Justice O’Connor ruled that because the defendants had failed 
to object to the jury instructions in the trial court, and because they had 
failed to demonstrate sufficient “cause” justifying this omission, that 
they were barred from seeking habeas corpus relief in the federal 
courts.19 
In Strickland v. Washington,20 a death penalty case, Justice 
 
 14. See id. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan stated: 
With all due respect, the Court has either misread the complaint or is improperly 
requiring the respondents to prove their case on the merits in order to defeat a motion to 
dismiss.  For example, the respondents specifically refer by name to at least 32 private 
schools that discriminate on the basis of race and yet continue to benefit illegally from 
tax-exempt status. Eighteen of those schools-including at least 14 elementary schools, 2 
junior high schools, and 1 high school-are located in the city of Memphis, Tenn., which 
has been the subject of several court orders to desegregate.  Similarly, the respondents 
cite two private schools in Orangeburg, S.C. that continue to benefit from federal tax 
exemptions even though they practice race discrimination in school districts that are 
desegregating pursuant to judicial and administrative orders.  At least with respect to 
these school districts, as well as the others specifically mentioned in the complaint, there 
can be little doubt that the respondents have identified communities containing “enough 
racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions . . . to make an 
appreciable difference in public school integration.” 
Id. (footnote, internal citations, and citations to briefs and the record omitted). 
 15. See id. at 759 (O’Connor, J.) (“The links in the chain of causation between the challenged 
Government conduct and the asserted injury are far too weak for the chain as a whole to sustain 
respondents’ standing.”). 
 16. See id. at 766 (reversing Court of Appeals, thereby reinstating judgment of district court 
dismissing claim for lack of constitutional standing). 
 17. 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (barring habeas corpus relief for constitutional claims that were not 
raised before the state courts, in the absence of sufficient cause justifying failure to raise claims). 
 18. See id. at 121-22 (O’Connor, J.) (setting forth respondents’ constitutional claim that the 
state bore the entire burden of disproving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 19. See id. at 124-34 (finding that respondents had failed to demonstrate sufficient cause 
justifying defense counsels’ failure to object to the jury instructions on allocation of the burden of 
proof as to self-defense). 
 20. 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (denying claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing 
phase of capital case). 
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O’Connor implicitly invoked the doctrine of “harmless error.”21  She 
ruled that even if the condemned man’s attorney had rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant’s death sentence would not be reversed unless the defendant 
could prove that there was a “reasonable probability” that the errors and 
omissions of his attorney had affected the outcome.22  Because the 
defendant was unable to meet this standard, his sentence was affirmed.23 
This early tendency of Justice O’Connor to dismiss claims on 
technical grounds extended to non-constitutional cases as well.  In Block 
v. Community Nutrition Institute,24  a group of consumers challenged an 
order of the Secretary of Agriculture raising the price of milk that 
processors must pay producers.25  Justice O’Connor did not even reach 
the question of whether the consumers had “standing,”26 but instead 
invoked the administrative law doctrine of “preclusion.”27  Although the 
federal statute governing this matter was silent as to the right of 
consumers to appeal milk market orders,28 Justice O’Connor inferred 
from the statute that Congress had intended to preclude consumers from 
challenging these orders.29 
There is one remarkable aspect about Justice O’Connor’s 
disposition of these cases on procedural grounds, however, and that is 
the depth of her analysis.  In each case she devotes considerable 
attention to developing a clear and precise outline of the relevant 
doctrine.  For example, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Allen v. Wright 
has become a landmark case because of how thoroughly she explained 
 
 21. See id. at 693-96, 699-701 (O’Connor, J.) (setting forth and applying standards for 
evaluating whether defendant was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel). 
 22. See id. at 694 (“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
 23. See id. at 699-700 (“The evidence that respondent says his trial counsel should have 
offered at the sentencing hearing would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the 
sentencing judge.”). 
 24. 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (dismissing consumers’ challenge of milk market orders). 
 25. See id. at 341-44 (O’Connor, J.) (describing milk market orders in general and the order 
being challenged in particular). 
 26. See id. at 353 n.4 (“Since congressional preclusion of judicial review is in effect 
jurisdictional, we need not address the standing issues. . . .”). 
 27. See id. at 345-53 (discussing and applying doctrine of preclusion). 
 28. See id. at 347 (“Nowhere in the Act, however, is there an express provision for 
participation by consumers in any proceeding.”). 
 29. See id. at 348 (“[W]e think it clear that Congress intended that judicial review of market 
orders issued under the Act ordinarily be confined to suits brought by handlers [and not 
consumers].”). 
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the constitutional underpinnings,30 the underlying purpose,31 and the 
multiple elements32 of the law of standing.  Two decades later her 
opinion is still the definitive statement of the law of constitutional 
standing.33 
During this early period on the Court, Justice O’Connor did not 
always avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional cases that came 
before her. One of the most significant decisions by O’Connor during 
this period was Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,34 where the 
Court declared a state university’s policy admitting only women to its 
nursing program was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.35  
Justice O’Connor also reached the merits of the “takings” claim in 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff36 in spite of the State’s contention 
that the federal courts should have abstained from deciding the case.37  
Both of these decisions were followed by the Court and the substantive 
principles that she recognized in those cases were reaffirmed.  Hogan 
laid the groundwork for the Court’s decision in United States v. 
Virginia38 while Midkiff was the principal case that the Court relied upon 
when it decided Kelo v. City of New London.39 
Justice O’Connor also decided other constitutional claims on the 
merits during this early period,40 but on the whole it must be admitted 
 
 30. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 (tracing standing doctrine to “case or controversy” requirement 
of Article III). 
 31. See id. at 750-51 (O’Connor, J.) (citing separation of powers concerns and pragmatic 
considerations that justify the law of standing). 
 32. See id. at 751 (“A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”) (citation omitted). 
 33. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004) 
(Stevens, J.); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 451 (1998) (Stevens, J.); and Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811, 818-819 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (all citing Allen for various aspects of the law of 
standing). 
 34. 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down policy of excluding men from admission to nursing 
program at state university as violation of Equal Protection Clause). 
 35. See id. at 733 (O’Connor, J.) (concluding that gender-based admissions policy violates 
Equal Protection). 
 36. 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (denying claim that state land redistribution program was a “public 
use” within the meaning of the Eminent Domain Clause). 
 37. Id. at 236-39 (O’Connor, J.) (discussing abstention doctrine and deciding that abstention 
was not required in this case). 
 38. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (striking down males-only admissions policy at public military 
college). 
 39. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (city’s exercise of power of eminent domain for private 
development complied with “public use” requirement of Fifth Amendment). 
 40. See, e.g., Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (O’Connor, J.) (invalidating loitering 
statute as void for vagueness); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (O’Connor, J.) (upholding 
protective search of passenger compartment during traffic stop); Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. 
v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (O’Connor, J.) (striking down state 
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that she frequently helped to bar the courthouse door to litigants with 
constitutional claims.  In contrast, two decades later at the close of her 
career we did not find Justice O’Connor so often splitting hairs in order 
to avoid adjudicating constitutional claims.41  Instead, she authored a 
number of significant decisions interpreting the substantive provisions of 
the Constitution and explicating the fundamental rights of all persons.  In 
the last two terms alone Justice O’Connor has written movingly of the 
necessity for affirmative action in students’ admission to educational 
institutions,42 the rights of homosexuals under the Equal Protection 
Clause,43 the separation of church and state as required by the 
Establishment Clause in the Ten Commandments cases,44 and the rights 
under the Due Process Clause of persons who are being detained as part 
of the “war on terror.”45 
Before turning to a review of these and other major cases, however, 
it is appropriate to consider two other general themes that have emerged 
as consistent markers of Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence.  These are 
her sensitivity to the precise factual context of the cases before her and 
her respect for the principle of stare decisis. 
II.  ATTENTION TO FACTUAL CONTEXT 
Few justices of the Supreme Court have been more faithful to 
Oliver Wendell Holmes’ maxims that “[g]eneral propositions do not 
decide concrete cases”46 and “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it 
has been experience.”47  Justice O’Connor devoutly believes that 
“context matters” in constitutional interpretation.48  For example, in City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.49 she ruled that the legal standard of 
“strict scrutiny” applies whenever the government treats people 
 
tax on paper and ink products under First Amendment). 
 41. But see O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (O’Connor, J.) (dismissing claim for 
habeas corpus relief on ground that prisoner had failed to present claim to highest court of state for 
discretionary review). 
 42. See infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. 
 43. See infra notes 120-27 and accompanying text. 
 44. See infra notes 154-59 and accompanying text. 
 45. See infra notes 160-69, 174 and accompanying text. 
 46. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 47. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 48. See Tracy Carbasho, Justice O’Connor Leaves Stellar Legacy Through Distinguished 
Service on Supreme Court, 7 LAWYERS J. 6 (2005) (quoting Professor John Burkoff to effect that 
“O’Connor’s biggest contribution to the court was her pragmatism and her willingness to look at the 
actual effect the court’s decisions had on real people, rather than focusing on doctrinal niceties”). 
 49. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down municipal minority set-aside program for public 
contracting). 
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differently on account of race, and therefore, strict scrutiny applied to an 
affirmative action program used to ensure that minority contractors 
would participate in municipal public works contracts.50  She repeated 
this requirement in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena51 where she 
stated: “[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed by 
whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by 
a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such 
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”52  Under strict 
scrutiny, the government has the burden of proving that the law in 
question is necessary for achieving a compelling governmental interest.53  
Because the City of Richmond was unable to prove that the minority 
contracting set aside program was the least restrictive means for 
accomplishing a compelling governmental interest, Justice O’Connor 
ruled that the program was unconstitutional.54  However, fourteen years 
after Croson and eight years after Adarand Justice O’Connor ruled that 
the strict version of strict scrutiny that she had applied in those two 
government contracting cases should not apply to affirmative action in 
admissions to public colleges and universities.  In Grutter v. Bollinger,55 
Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion holding that an affirmative action 
program in college admissions was constitutional, and although she paid 
lip service to the proposition that strict scrutiny applies to all racial 
distinctions that are drawn by the law, she applied a very relaxed version 
of strict scrutiny in Grutter; instead of requiring the university to prove 
that affirmative action in admissions served compelling governmental 
purposes, Justice O’Connor deferred to the judgment of university 
 
 50. See id. at 494 (O’Connor, J.) (“[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection 
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification.”). 
 51. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
 52. Id. at 227 (O’Connor, J.). 
 53. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 391 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The Law 
School has the burden of proving, in conformance with the standard of strict scrutiny, that it did not 
utilize race in an unconstitutional way.”). 
 54. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (“In sum, none of the evidence presented by the city points to 
any identified discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. We, therefore, hold that the 
city has failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities 
on the basis of race.”).  In Adarand the Court did not reach the question of whether the minority 
contracting set-aside program would survive strict scrutiny review, but instead remanded this 
question to the lower courts.  See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (O’Connor, J.) (“Because our decision 
today alters the playing field in some important respects, we think it best to remand the case to the 
lower courts for further consideration in light of the principles we have announced.”). 
 55. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding law school’s race-based affirmative action admissions 
program). 
HUHN1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:08:56 PM 
2006] THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 381 
officials on this core question.56  She stated: “Context matters when 
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection 
Clause.”57  In the following passage she explained why the strict scrutiny 
standard must be applied differently in different cases: 
 
Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and 
strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully 
examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons advanced by 
the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race in that particular 
context.58 
 
Grutter is not the only case where Justice O’Connor has adjusted a 
legal standard in light of the factual context.  In Lawrence v. Texas59 
Justice O’Connor found it would be inappropriate to apply the traditional 
form of the “rational basis test” to evaluate the constitutionality of a law 
that was directed against homosexuals.60  Noting that this law had the 
effect of “stigmatizing” gays and lesbians,61 Justice O’Connor declared, 
“When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group, we have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to 
strike down such laws under the Equal Protection Clause.”62  Employing 
this “more searching form of rational basis review,” Justice O’Connor 
voted to strike down the state law criminalizing homosexual conduct.63 
Justice O’Connor’s willingness to adjust the traditional standards of 
review according to the factual context of a case is essentially a 
balancing approach,64 and it is consistent with the approach of many 
 
 56. See id. at 328 (O’Connor, J.) (“Our scrutiny of the interest asserted by the Law School is 
no less strict for taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily 
within the expertise of the university. Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition of giving a 
degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally prescribed 
limits.”). 
 57. Id. at 327. 
 58. Id. at 327. 
 59. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating Texas statute making homosexual sodomy a crime). 
 60. See infra text accompanying note 62. 
 61. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Texas sodomy statute 
subjects homosexuals to ‘a lifelong penalty and stigma.’”) (citation omitted). 
 62. Id. at 580. 
 63. Id. at 585 (“I therefore concur in the Court’s judgment that Texas’ sodomy law banning 
‘deviate sexual intercourse’ between consenting adults of the same sex, but not between consenting 
adults of different sexes, is unconstitutional.”). 
 64. See C. Lincoln Combs, A Curious Choice: Hibbs v. Winn as a Case Study of Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s Balancing Jurisprudence, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 192 (2005) (“Justice O’Connor’s 
jurisprudential style has been called many things: accommodationist, marginalist, pragmatic, 
inconsistent, and unpredictable.  Perhaps the best way to describe her judicial analysis is 
‘balancing.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
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other thoughtful justices.  Justice John Harlan, for example, expressed 
the idea that questions of constitutional law essentially require us to 
balance competing considerations.  He described this balance in the 
following terms: 
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be 
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that 
through the course of this Court’s decisions it has represented the 
balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the 
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the 
demands of organized society.65 
Balancing tests have been devised and employed by a number of 
other justices, including Thurgood Marshall,66 John Paul Stevens,67 and 
Steven Breyer.68  Each of these judges implicitly recognized that 
standards of review such as “strict scrutiny” and “rational basis” are not 
constituent parts of the Constitution, but rather are useful tools for 
interpreting and applying the Constitution.  These standards are not 
constitutional doctrine in the same sense as “freedom of speech” or 
“liberty” or “equality.”  They are instead judicially-created frameworks 
useful for explaining the underlying principles of constitutional law by 
 
 65. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,dissenting) (dissenting from denial of 
certiorari in case challenging the constitutionality of a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of 
contraceptives).  See also Kathleen Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 80 (“The Casey joint opinion authors’ defection to Harlanism enraged Justice 
Scalia . . . .”). 
 66. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting): 
The Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of 
two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review–strict scrutiny or 
mere rationality. But this Court’s decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy 
categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has 
applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of 
care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, 
on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the 
recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn. 
 67. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“[O]ur cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications 
which have been explained in opinions by terms ranging from ‘strict scrutiny’ at one extreme to 
‘rational basis’ at the other.  I have never been persuaded that these so-called ‘standards’ adequately 
explain the decisional process.”). 
 68. See Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 
741(1996) (Breyer, J.).  “[T]he First Amendment embodies an overarching commitment to protect 
speech from government regulation through close judicial scrutiny, thereby enforcing the 
Constitution’s constraints, but without imposing judicial formulas so rigid that they become a 
straitjacket that disables government from responding to serious problems.” Id. 
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identifying all of the elements that enter the constitutional calculus and 
by assigning the burden of proof as to each of those elements.69 
The fact-based approach of Justice O’Connor releases her from 
ideology and makes possible her role as the “moderate” justice between 
the liberal and conservative wings of the Supreme Court.70  She inherited 
the mantle of “swing justice” from Justice Lewis Powell71 and it is 
noteworthy that in key cases she has closely followed his rulings which 
employed the use of flexible legal standards.  In Grutter, Justice 
O’Connor expressly adopted Justice Powell’s reasoning which applied 
strict scrutiny but which deferred to educational institutions on the 
question of admissions.72  Similarly in Casey, she and the other members 
of the plurality expressly adopted Justice Powell’s “undue burden” test 
in abortion cases.73  Justice O’Connor admires Lewis Powell,74 and like 
him she has attempted to avoid being confined by doctrine in order to 
give full expression to the constitutional conflict that arises from the 
factual context of the case. 
Professor Ken Gormley, a friend of Justice O’Connor, has been 
quoted to the effect that “[Justice O’Connor’s] experience as Senate 
majority leader in Arizona gave her the ability to build consensus on the 
 
 69. See generally Wilson Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both 
Content Based and Content Neutral, 79 IND. L. J. 801 (2004); Wilson Huhn, Scienter, Causation, 
and Harm: The Right-Hand Side of the Constitutional Calculus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 125 
(2004) (describing a balancing approach to determining the constitutionality of laws under the First 
Amendment). 
 70. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 71. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The O’Connor Legacy, 41 TRIAL 68 (September, 2005) (“Since 
1987, when Justice Lewis Powell retired, Sandra Day O’Connor has been considered the decisive 
vote in countless areas of constitutional law. Most years, she was in the majority in 5-4 decisions 
more often than any other justice.”). 
 72. See Grutter, 539 U.S., at 330.  Justice O’Connor stated: 
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest, 
Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the 
First Amendment, of educational autonomy: ‘The freedom of a university to make its 
own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body.’  From this 
premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming ‘the right to select those students who 
will contribute the most to the ‘robust exchange of ideas,’’ a university ‘seek[s] to 
achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.’ 
Id. at 330 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (Powell, J.)). 
 73. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-474 (1977) (Powell, J.) (“Roe did not declare an 
unqualified “constitutional right to an abortion,” as the District Court seemed to think. Rather, the 
right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy.”). 
 74. See generally SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, 147-50 (2003) (chapter on Lewis Powell, one of six justices earning a 
separate chapter in Justice O’Connor’s judicial memoir). 
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court even when the most divisive issues were being discussed.”75  
However, her ability to seek compromise is not universally admired; 
Justice O’Connor’s nuanced approach and moderate views have been 
criticized in some quarters.76  For example, conservative columnist 
Charles Krauthammer has stated: “Unlike a principled conservative such 
as Antonin Scalia, or a principled liberal such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
O’Connor had no stable ideas about constitutional interpretation.”77  
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, apparently finds Justice O’Connor to 
be too ideological!78  Justice O’Connor has never responded to her 
critics in kind.  The dignified tone of her judicial opinions reflects the 
same level of professionalism that is evident in her attention to detail and 
her thorough legal analysis.79  
III.  RESPECT FOR PRECEDENT 
During her tenure on the Court Justice O’Connor has demonstrated 
her commitment to precedent and her devotion to the principle of stare 
decisis.80 
Justice O’Connor set forth a comprehensive approach to precedent 
in the plurality opinion that she co-authored with Justice Kennedy and 
Justice Souter in Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
 
 75. Carbasho, supra note 48, at 11. 
 76. See Combs, supra note 64 (citing authorities characterizing Justice O’Connor’s reasoning 
as “accommodationist,” “marginalist,” “inconsistent,” and “unpredictable”). 
 77. Charles Krauthammer, Philosophy for a Judge, WASH. POST. July 8, 2005, at A23, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/07/AR2005070701 
898.html (last visited Dec. 14, 2005). 
 78. See Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833, 981(Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (where he accuses the majority of the justices of the Court of succumbing to the 
temptation of “systematically eliminating checks upon its own power”); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia criticized: 
Today’s opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession 
culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean 
the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral 
opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct. 
Id. 
 79. See O’CONNOR, supra note 74, at 228 (“Ranting and raving probably do little to convince.  
A more persuasive technique is to present yourself as a reasonable person who wants to see justice 
done . . . .”) (from her chapter on Professionalism). 
 80. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(refusing to join majority opinion altering the application of the Miranda rule, and stating, “Were 
the Court writing from a clean slate, I could agree with its holding. But Miranda is now the law and, 
in my view, the Court has not provided sufficient justification for departing from it or for blurring 
its now clear strictures.”); see also George C. Thomas, III, The End of the Road for Miranda v. 
Arizona?: On the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 33 
(describing Justice O’Connor as “reluctant to overrule precedent”). 
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Pennsylvania.81  In that case, the plurality carefully explained why they 
believed that it was not justified to overrule Roe v. Wade.  Here are the 
central paragraphs of that opinion summarizing the four factors that a 
Justice of the Supreme Court should take into account in deciding 
whether to follow or to overrule constitutional precedent: 
[I]t is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an 
“inexorable command,” and certainly it is not such in every 
constitutional case.  Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior 
holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of prudential 
and pragmatic considerations designed to test the consistency of 
overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to 
gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. 
Thus, for example, we may ask whether the rule has proven to be 
intolerable simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is 
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the 
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; 
whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left 
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether 
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have 
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.82 
Justice O’Connor and her colleagues in the Casey plurality did not 
simply articulate the factors that should influence the Court to follow or 
to overturn judicial precedent; rather, they engaged in an extended 
discussion of constitutional history in order to demonstrate how these 
principles had been applied in the past.  In order to illustrate the meaning 
and the importance of the Casey factors, the plurality thoroughly 
discussed and carefully distinguished two occasions when the Supreme 
Court had found it necessary to overrule significant constitutional 
doctrine.  The plurality painstakingly explained why it was appropriate 
for the Court to overturn the principle of “economic substantive due 
process” in 1937 in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish83 and why it was 
appropriate to overturn the principle of “separate but equal” in Brown v. 
Board of Education84 in 1954.85  The plurality in Casey applied the four 
factors that they had previously identified in showing that the Court in 
 
 81. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe but upholding some regulations of abortion). 
 82. Id. at 854-55 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, JJ., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 83. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding Washington State statute setting minimum wage for 
women). 
 84. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down State laws and policies requiring separation of the 
races in the public schools). 
 85. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, JJ., concurring) 
(discussing Court’s decision to overrule precedent in Parrish and Brown). 
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those cases had been justified in overruling Plessy v. Ferguson86 and 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.87  The plurality argued that Roe was 
different from either Plessy or Adkins.88 
Applying the four elements of stare decisis, Justice O’Connor and 
the other two members of the Casey plurality concluded that Roe v. 
Wade should not be overruled because the central holding of Roe – that a 
woman has a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy prior to 
viability – had not proven to be unworkable for the courts to apply, it 
could not be removed without inequity to individuals or instability to a 
society which had come to rely upon it, it had not been undermined by 
subsequent cases, and it was not based upon facts or understandings of 
fact which had proven false.89 
The question at the heart of the Casey decision – whether Roe 
should be overruled – has remained the principal constitutional question 
facing this Nation.  Even thirteen years after Casey and thirty-two years 
after Roe, this issue has proven to be the single greatest constitutional 
concern in the minds of the American people.  This was amply 
demonstrated at the recent Senate hearings on the candidacy of John 
Roberts, Jr., for the Supreme Court, where Senator Arlen Specter, 
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, reportedly said, “The 
hearing has dealt extensively with . . . a woman’s right to choose. . . .  It 
 
 86. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
(upholding Louisiana statute requiring separation of the races on passenger trains). 
 87. 261 U.S. 525 (1923) overruled in part by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937) (striking down law establishing minimum wage for women). 
 88. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-65 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, JJ., concurring). 
In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life, changed circumstances may impose 
new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation could accept each decision to 
overrule a prior case as a response to the Court’s constitutional duty.  Because the cases 
before us present no such occasion it could be seen as no such response. 
Id. 
 89. See id. at 860-61 (Kennedy, O’Connor, and Souter, JJ., concurring). 
The sum of the precedential inquiry to this point shows Roe’s underpinnings 
unweakened in any way affecting its central holding. While it has engendered 
disapproval, it has not been unworkable. An entire generation has come of age free to 
assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and 
to make reproductive decisions; no erosion of principle going to liberty or personal 
autonomy has left Roe’s central holding a doctrinal remnant; Roe portends no 
developments at odds with other precedent for the analysis of personal liberty; and no 
changes of fact have rendered viability more or less appropriate as the point at which the 
balance of interests tips. Within the bounds of normal stare decisis analysis, then, and 
subject to the considerations on which it customarily turns, the stronger argument is for 
affirming Roe’s central holding, with whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us 
may have, not for overruling it. 
Id. 
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boiled down really to Judge Roberts’ statement that he felt he could not 
speak to that issue.”90 
In evaluating candidates for the High Court, I recommend that they 
be asked, not “Would you vote to overrule Roe v. Wade?” but rather, 
“What are the factors that militate in favor of or against overruling major 
cases?”  Interested citizens and our Senators should attempt to determine 
whether candidates will follow in the footsteps of Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor in her respect for the principle of stare decisis.  They should 
attempt to determine whether the candidate accepts the relatively strict 
formula that Justice O’Connor and the other members of the plurality 
developed in Casey. 
The plurality’s opinion in Casey transcends the question of abortion 
and touches upon a question that lies at the heart of the American 
constitutional experiment.  In light of the fact that the meaning of the 
Constitution changes over time, is our Constitution a law or simply a 
collection of political principles?  This is a critically important question 
for any society that considers itself to be a government of laws, not of 
men.  As Justice John Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison,91 the 
Constitution is not only a law, it is a supreme and paramount law,92 and 
the power of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution stems from 
the premise that the Constitution is law.93  If the Constitution is a law, 
how is it possible that the meaning of that law changes over time? 
Justices who do not respect precedent – Justices who would 
 
 90. See, e.g., Jan Crawford Greenburg, How Focus on Roe Pushes Aside Other Court Issues, 
CHI. TRIB., December 29, 2005, at C1. 
After days of testimony, dozens of witnesses and hundreds of questions, the Senate 
hearings for John Roberts Jr.’s Supreme Court nomination ended exactly as they began, 
focused on one case and one issue. “The hearing has dealt extensively with . . . a 
woman’s right to choose,” Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) said in 
the waning minutes on Sept. 15. “It boiled down really to Judge Roberts’‘ statement that 
he felt he could not speak to that issue.” Throughout his testimony, Roberts—like every 
other Supreme Court nominee in recent decades—confronted and deflected scores of 
questions aimed at whether he would vote to overturn Roe vs. Wade, the court’s 
landmark decision that gave women a constitutional right to an abortion.  Roe is certain 
to be the central issue in hearings, scheduled to start Jan. 9, on federal Judge Samuel 
Alito’s  nomination, as well. 
Id. 
 91. 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (establishing the primacy of the Constitution and the principle of 
judicial review). 
 92. Id. at 177 (Marshall, C.J.) (“Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions 
contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently 
the theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the 
constitution, is void.”). 
 93. Id. (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”). 
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overrule doctrine and decisions that they disagree with, without giving 
any weight to the considered judgment of their forebears – are not being 
faithful to the Constitution because they are conducting themselves as if 
the Constitution were not a law.  If stare decisis has no independent 
weight – if precedent can be freely overruled whenever a majority of the 
Court agrees – then in confirming nominees it would make perfect sense 
to demand to know how they intend to rule in specific cases.  On the 
other hand, if stare decisis is an important constitutional principle – if 
we continue to appoint Justices who respect precedent – then it becomes 
much less necessary to ascertain a candidate’s personal views about 
specific cases.  While the Constitution changes over time, it is not 
acceptable that the Constitution should be expected to change with every 
Presidential election, like foreign policy94 or administrative law.95  The 
concept of the Constitution as law is preserved precisely because of the 
four factors set forth in the Casey plurality opinion.  Furthermore, as the 
Casey plurality explained, questionable interpretations of the 
Constitution which are unworkable, which are not being relied upon, 
which have been undermined, or which are based upon false premises 
may be justifiably overruled – in fact they should be overruled.  We may 
thank Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter for this important 
 
 94. See David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 
U. COLO. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (criticizing judicial deference to President’s interpretation of treaties, 
and stating, “there is very real cause for concern in unbridled judicial deference to executive branch 
decision making in the foreign relations area”). 
 95. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837, 865-
866 (1984) (Stevens, J.) (upholding regulation reversing environmental policy of previous 
administration). Justice Stevens stated: 
an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within 
the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of 
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of 
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which 
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by 
the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 
Id. See also Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a new 
President of a different political party. It is readily apparent that the responsible members 
of one administration may consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more 
important than do their counterparts in a previous administration. A change in 
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable 
basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and 
regulations. As long as the agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it 
is entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light of the 
philosophy of the administration. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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insight. 
We also owe a debt of gratitude to Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter for their candid description of the toll that dedication to the 
rule of law exacts from its devotees.  Justice O’Connor and the other 
members of the Casey plurality described the moral strength that the 
principle of stare decisis demands: 
Some cost will be paid by anyone who approves or implements a 
constitutional decision where it is unpopular, or who refuses to work to 
undermine the decision or to force its reversal. The price may be 
criticism or ostracism, or it may be violence. An extra price will be 
paid by those who themselves disapprove of the decision’s results 
when viewed outside of constitutional terms, but who nevertheless 
struggle to accept it, because they respect the rule of law. To all those 
who will be so tested by following, the Court implicitly undertakes to 
remain steadfast, lest in the end a price be paid for nothing. The 
promise of constancy, once given, binds its maker for as long as the 
power to stand by the decision survives and the understanding of the 
issue has not changed so fundamentally as to render the commitment 
obsolete. From the obligation of this promise this Court cannot and 
should not assume any exemption when duty requires it to decide a 
case in conformance with the Constitution. A willing breach of it 
would be nothing less than a breach of faith, and no Court that broke 
its faith with the people could sensibly expect credit for principle in the 
decision by which it did that.96 
IV.  FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
Over the past quarter-century Justice O’Connor has played a key 
role in defining our fundamental rights.  She has made substantial 
contributions to our understanding of constitutional principles such as 
the right to privacy, gay rights, affirmative action, the separation of 
church and state, and federalism.  Furthermore, in all of these areas her 
views have evolved as her insight into these subjects broadened and 
deepened over the years. 
A.  Abortion and the Right to Privacy 
Sandra Day O’Connor saved Roe v. Wade.  In 1992 four justices, 
including the Chief Justice, stood ready to overrule Roe.97  In what 
 
 96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867-68 (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
 97. See id. at 944 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
(joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.) (“We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it 
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Justice Blackmun called “an act of personal courage and constitutional 
principle[,]”98 Justice O’Connor, along with Justices Anthony Kennedy 
and David Souter, voted to reaffirm Roe. 
Justice O’Connor had announced her personal opposition to 
abortion at her confirmation hearing in 1981, although she appropriately 
refused to answer how she would rule if the question of abortion were to 
come before the Court again.99  Over the next decade a number of 
abortion cases were accepted for certiorari, but Justice O’Connor 
steadfastly refused to vote to say whether she would overturn Roe.100  
Finally, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey,101 Justice O’Connor made up her mind.  In that case, Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter declared in ringing terms that a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy before the point of fetal viability 
is a constitutional right.102  In the plurality opinion that they jointly 
authored they explained why the Constitution protects a woman’s right 
to make this decision: 
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled 
to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman 
is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to 
the law. The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to 
anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That 
these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been 
endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others 
and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the 
 
can and should be overruled . . . .”). 
 98. Id. at 923 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part). 
 99. See Grover Rees III, Questions for Supreme Court Nominees at Confirmation Hearings: 
Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REV. 913, 918 n.11 (1983) (quoting Justice O’Connor as 
giving the following personal opinion regarding abortion, “[I]t is something that is repugnant to 
me. . . .”); see also id. at 918 (noting that she declined to answer questions of constitutional law). 
 100. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 526 (1989) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“When the constitutional invalidity of a 
State’s abortion statute actually turns on the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade, there will be 
time enough to reexamine Roe.  And to do so carefully.”). 
 101. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming Roe while upholding some regulations of abortion). 
 102. See id. at 901 (O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.). 
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and 
then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation must learn anew 
that the Constitution’s written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive 
more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full 
meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it once again to 
define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution’s own promise, the promise of liberty. 
Id. 
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State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and 
personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of 
the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course 
of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be 
shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual 
imperatives and her place in society.103 
The significance of the plurality opinion in Casey was not limited 
to abortion. As previously mentioned, the three justices comprehensively 
examined the concept of stare decisis in constitutional cases.104  In 
addition, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter delivered the clearest 
and strongest statement to date of the Right to Privacy generally.  
Referring to decisions protecting constitutional rights involving 
“marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education,”105 the plurality stated: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State.106 
This statement of the Right to Privacy was expressly endorsed by a 
majority of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas.107 
Just as Justice O’Connor saved a woman’s right to terminate an 
early pregnancy, she was also instrumental in saving the Right to 
Privacy generally.  Prior to Casey Justice Antonin Scalia, in footnote six 
of his opinion in the case of Michael H. v. Gerald D.,108 had declared 
that our fundamental rights arise from two sources, and two sources only 
– specific constitutional text and specific American traditions.109  In 
refusing to recognize concepts such as “parenthood” or “family 
 
 103. See id. at 852. 
 104. See supra notes 81-89, and accompanying text. 
 105. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
 106. Id. (Kennedy, J., O’Connor, J., and Souter, J., plurality opinion). 
 107. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J.) (“Persons in a homosexual relationship may 
seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would 
deny them this right.”). 
 108. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding California statute preventing biological father from 
establishing paternity of child born to a woman married to another man). 
 109. Id. at 127 n.6 (Scalia, J.). 
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relationships” as embodying constitutional rights, Justice Scalia stated 
broadly that “a rule of law that binds neither by text nor by any 
particular, identifiable tradition is no rule of law at all.”110  By limiting 
constitutional rights to those expressly set forth in the Bill of Rights111 
and to those which have been traditionally recognized, Justice Scalia 
would have cut off the constitutional claims of any groups who have 
been traditionally oppressed.  Traditional notions of justice or morality, 
no matter how irrational or unfair, would by definition be constitutional 
under Justice Scalia’s crabbed interpretation of American liberty. 
In Michael H., Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, 
refused to agree to this portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion.  In a 
concurrence that is just four sentences long, she rejected the concept of 
equating “liberty” with “tradition:” 
I concur in all but footnote 6 of Justice Scalia’s opinion. This footnote 
sketches a mode of historical analysis to be used when identifying 
liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that may be somewhat inconsistent with our past 
decisions in this area.  On occasion the Court has characterized 
relevant traditions protecting asserted rights at levels of generality that 
might not be “the most specific level” available.  I would not foreclose 
the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical 
analysis.112 
In refusing to “foreclose the unanticipated,” Justice O’Connor 
demonstrated the wisdom and restraint that are the hallmarks of her 
jurisprudence.  This concurring opinion by the two moderate members 
of the Supreme Court effectively blocked efforts to limit the right to 
privacy to those rights which have been traditionally recognized. 
After Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist made one more effort to limit 
the scope of our fundamental rights to traditional rights in Washington v. 
Glucksberg,113 which dealt with the right of assisted suicide.114  In 
upholding a state statute that prohibited assisted suicide in all 
circumstances, the Chief Justice stated in his majority opinion that our 
fundamental rights consist of those which are “deeply rooted in our legal 
 
 110. Id.  
 111. Compare U.S. Const., amend. 9 (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
 112. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 113. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding Washington statute forbidding assisted suicide). 
 114. See id. at 705-06 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“The question presented in this case is whether 
Washington’s prohibition against ‘caus[ing]’ or ‘aid[ing]’ a suicide offends the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”). 
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tradition.”115  While concurring that there is no general constitutional 
right to commit suicide, Justice O’Connor wrote separately and reserved 
judgment upon the question of whether such a right might accrue to “a 
mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering.”116  In 
this instance, as in Michael H., Justice O’Connor once again refused to 
“foreclose the unanticipated” in defining the sources of law from which 
our fundamental rights are thought to originate. 
Justice O’Connor’s decision to recognize that our fundamental 
rights are not defined solely by reference to tradition has a broader 
implication as well.  The corollary to the idea that tradition does not 
utterly encompass all fundamental rights is the principle that traditional 
notions of right and wrong – moral traditions – are not sufficient to 
justify laws that treat people differently.  This corollary was brought to 
fruition in Lawrence v. Texas117 which is the subject of the next portion 
of this essay. 
B.  Gay Rights – From Bowers to Lawrence 
In the field of gay rights, Justice O’Connor has moved from being 
an instrument of oppression to becoming an exponent of toleration and 
equality. 
In 1986, Justice O’Connor concurred in the majority opinion 
authored by Justice Byron White in Bowers v. Hardwick.118  In that 
decision, Justice White upheld a Georgia statute that on its face made all 
acts of sodomy – homosexual and heterosexual – a crime.  However, the 
Court’s ruling was limited to a finding that homosexual sodomy could 
lawfully be proscribed, and it did not reach the question of whether the 
law could be applied against a heterosexual couple.119  The Court did not 
 
 115. Id. at 722 (“[T]he outlines of the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples involving fundamental 
rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition.”). 
 116. Id. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 117. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas law criminalizing homosexual sodomy). 
 118. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (upholding 
Georgia sodomy statute as applied to homosexual behavior). 
 119. See id. at 188 n.2 (White, J.).  The Court noted: 
John and Mary Doe were also plaintiffs in the action. They alleged that they wished to 
engage in sexual activity proscribed by [the Georgia statute] in the privacy of their home, 
and that they had been “chilled and deterred” from engaging in such activity by both the 
existence of the statute and Hardwick’s arrest.  The District Court held, however, that 
because they had neither sustained, nor were in immediate danger of sustaining, any 
direct injury from the enforcement of the statute, they did not have proper standing to 
maintain the action.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment 
dismissing the Does’ claim for lack of standing, and the Does do not challenge that 
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consider whether the Georgia statute, so construed, constituted a 
violation of Equal Protection. 
In 2003, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice 
O’Connor addressed the issue that had been left open by the Court 
seventeen years previously in Bowers, and she concluded that a State 
law could not criminalize homosexual sodomy without also 
criminalizing the same conduct by heterosexual couples.120  In 
accordance with her reluctance to overrule precedent, she did not join 
the majority opinion in Lawrence, overruling Bowers on Due Process 
grounds.121  However, her separate concurrence on Equal Protection 
grounds contains a vigorous defense of the rights of gay and lesbian 
individuals, and it does so in a manner that extends constitutional 
protection to all oppressed, unpopular groups.  She makes three key 
points in reaching the conclusion that this law was unconstitutional. 
First, Justice O’Connor rejected the notion that this law was aimed 
at conduct and not a class of people, stating: “While it is true that the law 
applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that 
is closely correlated with being homosexual.”122 
The second pivotal holding of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in 
Lawrence is that “moral disapproval” of a group of people or their 
behavior is not a sufficient basis to justify a law that criminally penalizes 
that conduct.  Indeed, Justice O’Connor went beyond this point, and 
added that “moral disapproval” is not even a legitimate governmental 
 
holding in this Court. 
The only claim properly before the Court, therefore, is Hardwick’s challenge to the 
Georgia statute as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy. We express no opinion on 
the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to other acts of sodomy. 
Id. at 188 n.2 (White, J.) (citations omitted). 
 120. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 121. See id. at 582.  Justice O’Connor stated: 
In Bowers we held that a state law criminalizing sodomy as applied to homosexual 
couples did not violate substantive due process. We rejected the argument that no 
rational basis existed to justify the law, pointing to the government’s interest in 
promoting morality. The only question in front of the Court in Bowers was whether the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause protected a right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.  Bowers did not hold that moral disapproval of a group is a rational 
basis under the Equal Protection Clause to criminalize homosexual sodomy when 
heterosexual sodomy is not punished. 
This case raises a different issue than Bowers whether, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state interest to justify by itself a statute that 
bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is not. Moral disapproval of 
this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy 
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Id. at 582 (citations omitted). 
 122. Id. at 583. 
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interest, in effect equating “moral disapproval, without any other 
asserted state interest” with irrational prejudice: 
Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other 
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal 
Protection Clause to justify a law that discriminates among groups of 
persons. 
Moral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental 
interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications 
must not be “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
burdened by the law.”123 
Justice O’Connor’s decision to protect non-traditional behavior in 
Lawrence is consistent with her refusal to agree with the position of 
Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist defining constitutional rights 
solely by reference to tradition.124  In my opinion, the Lawrence case 
firmly entrenches the proposition that constitutional rights are not 
circumscribed by tradition, but rather encompass broader principles that 
transcend tradition. 
The third important aspect of Justice O’Connor’s concurring 
opinion in Lawrence is that it identifies the real reason that this law was 
enacted, and in doing so, it cut to the heart of the question of gay rights.  
Justice O’Connor objected to the Texas law because it “brands all 
homosexuals as criminals” thus justifying discrimination against 
them.125  She noted that the real purpose and function of this law may 
not have been to prosecute people for consensual homosexual conduct, 
but rather that the law served as “a statement of dislike and disapproval 
against homosexuals.”126  She concluded: 
 
 123. See id. at 582-83 (citations omitted); see also id. at 582 (“This case raises a different issue 
than Bowers: whether, under the Equal Protection Clause, moral disapproval is a legitimate state 
interest to justify by itself a statute that bans homosexual sodomy, but not heterosexual sodomy. It is 
not.”). 
 124. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 581. 
[T]he effect of Texas’ sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of prosecution or 
consequence of conviction.  Texas’ sodomy law brands all homosexuals as criminals, 
thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as 
everyone else.  Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects of 
the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law “legally sanctions 
discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,” 
including in the areas of “employment, family issues, and housing.” 
Id.  (citations omitted). 
 126. See id. at 583 (“[A]s applied to private, consensual acts, the law serves more as a 
statement of dislike and disapproval against homosexuals than as a tool to stop criminal behavior.”). 
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A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the 
State’s moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with 
that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal 
Protection Clause, under any standard of review.  I therefore concur in 
the Court’s judgment that Texas’ sodomy law banning “deviate sexual 
intercourse” between consenting adults of the same sex, but not 
between consenting adults of different sexes, is unconstitutional.127 
Justice O’Connor’s final point is of great significance to the 
ongoing debate over gay rights.  In my opinion, homosexuals were 
scapegoated in the 2004 Presidential election by many politicians and 
political organizations.128  Homosexuals are the bogeymen who are no 
longer in the closet, but who are rather emerging from it to claim equal 
rights to health care, to employment, and to marriage.129  The criminal 
law that was struck down in Lawrence was the foundation for all of the 
other discrimination heaped upon homosexuals.130  By exposing the bias 
against homosexuals as nothing more than bigotry, Justice O’Connor 
helped to shatter the philosophical cornerstone of societal discrimination 
against homosexuals to such an extent that it cannot be rebuilt. 
C.  Affirmative Action – The Effect on Society 
I described above how Justice O’Connor changed the application of 
the strict scrutiny rule from what it had been in Croson, where the 
burden of proof was on the government, to Grutter, where the 
 
 127. Id. at 585. 
 128. See, e.g., Steve Hoffman, Blackwell Rising, Where is Ohio Headed?  Ken’s Prescriptions 
Sound More Appealing Than They Are, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, September 29, 2005, B3 (“The 
2004 presidential election also worked in [Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth] Blackwell’s favor. The 
Republicans relied on their conservative base to win, and Blackwell helped by supporting a mean-
spirited (and wildly successful) amendment banning gay marriage that bolstered turnout.”); Philip 
Morris, Blackwell Puts His Prejudice on Display, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, October 26, 2004, 
Forum B9 (quoting Blackwell at a rally before a Toledo church group as saying, “But I can tell you 
right now that the notion [gay marriage] even defies barnyard logic . . . the barnyard knows 
better.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, Ohio Issue 1 Is Unconstitutional, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1 (citing 
reports of the thousands of gay couples who attempted to marry across the United States in the fall 
of 2004). 
 130. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This reasoning leaves on pretty 
shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.”). 
Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as 
partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children’s 
schools, or as boarders in their home. They view this as protecting themselves and their 
families from a lifestyle that they believe to be immoral and destructive. The Court views 
it as ‘discrimination’ which it is the function of our judgments to deter. 
Id. 
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government was given the benefit of the doubt.131  But there is another 
more significant reason why Justice O’Connor concluded that 
affirmative action programs in public contracting were unconstitutional 
while affirmative action programs in admission to institutions of higher 
education were constitutional.  Justice O’Connor recognized that the 
reasons justifying affirmative action in education are far more 
compelling than the reasons supporting affirmative action in contracting. 
In Croson Justice O’Connor had vowed that non-remedial purposes 
– essentially social engineering – cannot be used to justify affirmative 
action programs.  Her language on this point was seemingly 
comprehensive and unambiguous.  She stated that “[c]lassifications 
based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly 
reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial 
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.”132 
In light of this ruling, it appeared that non-remedial affirmative 
action was dead.133  But when Justice O’Connor was faced with the same 
question that had confronted Justice Lewis Powell in Regents of 
University of California Regents v. Bakke134 she came to the same 
conclusion that Justice Powell had that affirmative action in admissions 
to colleges and universities could be justified by the importance of 
diversity within the educational environment.135  However, she went 
even farther than Justice Powell had in identifying the policy 
justifications that support affirmative action in higher education.  She 
added the observation that affirmative action in admission to colleges 
and universities is necessary to serve societal goals as well as 
pedagogical ones.  She stated: 
 
 131. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying notes. 
 132. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (O’Connor, J.). 
 133. See Charles Fried, Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A 
Response to the Scholars’ Statement, 99 YALE L.J. 155 (1989) (“The principal, perhaps the only, 
state interest  sufficiently compelling to meet this burden [of strict scrutiny] is the remedying of 
identified acts of discrimination.”) (footnote omitted). 
 134. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (invalidating use of racial quotas for admission to medical school but 
upholding use of race as a factor that may be considered). 
 135. See id. at 314 (Powell, J.). 
Physicians serve a heterogeneous population. An otherwise qualified medical student 
with a particular background-whether it be ethnic, geographic, culturally advantaged or 
disadvantaged-may bring to a professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and 
ideas that enrich the training of its student body and better equip its graduates to render 
with understanding their vital service to humanity. 
Id.; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 308 (O’Connor, J.) (“[T]he Law School defines its critical mass concept by 
reference to the substantial, important, and laudable educational benefits that diversity is designed to 
produce, including cross-racial understanding and the breaking down of racial stereotypes.”). 
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[U]niversities, and in particular, law schools, represent the training 
ground for a large number of our Nation’s leaders.  Individuals with 
law degrees occupy roughly half the state governorships, more than 
half the seats in the United States Senate, and more than a third of the 
seats in the United States House of Representatives.  The pattern is 
even more striking when it comes to highly selective law schools. A 
handful of these schools accounts for 25 of the 100 United States 
Senators, 74 United States Courts of Appeals judges, and nearly 200 of 
the more than 600 United States District Court judges.  In order to 
cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry, it 
is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and 
qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.136 
This aspect of Justice O’Connor’s opinion greatly strengthens the 
foundation supporting affirmative action programs.  Her reasoning looks 
to the future, not to the past, to evaluate the usefulness or necessity for 
these programs, and it considers all of the consequences of affirmative 
action upon our society – not merely the consequences that occur within 
the walls of academia, but what kind of society we will live in if 
minority groups do not have the opportunity to earn advanced degrees 
from the nation’s more prestigious institutions.  Justice O’Connor’s 
analysis takes into account not merely how the individuals and 
educational institutions in question are affected by affirmative action, 
but also how society as a whole is affected.  Justice O’Connor’s 
comprehensive approach enabled the Court to evaluate all of the factors 
that bear upon the constitutionality of affirmative action. 
D.  Establishment Clause – The “No Endorsement” Test 
In 1984, in Lynch v. Donnelly,137 Justice O’Connor produced a 
concurring opinion setting forth her understanding of the Establishment 
Clause.138  Lynch involved the question of whether a nativity scene could 
be included in a town-sponsored holiday display that included Santa 
Claus and other secular elements,139 and Justice O’Connor supplied the 
 
 136. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332 (O’Connor, J.) (citations omitted). 
 137. 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding inclusion of nativity scene in municipal display as one 
element in a secular holiday display). 
 138. See id. at 687-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 139. See id. at 671 (Burger, C.J.). 
The Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decorations traditionally 
associated with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus house, reindeer 
pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures 
representing such characters as a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of 
colored lights, a large banner that reads “SEASONS GREETINGS,” and the crèche at 
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fifth vote upholding the inclusion of the nativity scene.140  However, in 
her separate concurrence she declared the principle that the 
Establishment Clause prohibits “government endorsement or disapproval 
of religion.”141  At this time the leading case on the Establishment 
Clause was Lemon v. Kurtzman142 where the Court had stated that in 
order to pass constitutional muster a law must have a secular purpose, it 
must have a primary secular effect, and there must be no excessive 
entanglement with religion.143  In the following passage from Lynch 
Justice O’Connor explained how to reconcile the Lemon test with the 
rule against “endorsement” of religion: 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual 
purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. The effect prong asks 
whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice 
under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. 
An affirmative answer to either question should render the challenged 
practice invalid.144 
Justice O’Connor adhered to the “no endorsement” test throughout 
her tenure on the Court,145 and during most of that time the “no 
endorsement” test has been the moderate position between the “no 
coercion” test of the conservative wing of the Court and the “purely 
secular purpose” test of the liberal wing.146 
 
issue here. 
Id. 
 140. See id. at 687 (O’Connor, J, concurring). 
 141. Id. at 687-88. 
 142. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down state statutes providing funds directly to parochial 
schools as violation of Establishment Clause). 
 143. See id. at 612-13 (Burger, C.J.) (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.”) (citation 
omitted). 
 144. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 145. See, e.g., McCreary County, Kentucky, v. A.C.L.U., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring) (utilizing endorsement test). 
 146. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (striking down prayers at public school 
graduations); id. at 599 (Kennedy, J.,) (using “no coercion” test and stating, “No holding by this 
Court suggests that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in a religious 
exercise.”); id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Government may neither promote nor affiliate itself 
with any religious doctrine or organization, nor may it obtrude itself in the internal affairs of any 
religious institution.”); id. at 618-26 (Souter, J., concurring) (contending that the Establishment 
Clause forbids government endorsement of religion in addition to coercive laws or policies); id. at 
640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the Establishment Clause prohibits only government 
coercion “by force of law and threat of penalty” as well as endorsement of the views of a particular 
religious sect). 
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In another hard-fought and important Establishment Clause case, 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,147 the school voucher case,148 Justice 
O’Connor voted with the 5-4 majority to uphold the school voucher 
program, but once again she wrote separately, and once again she 
exhibited her hallmarks of respect for precedent and careful attention to 
factual context.149  Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion thoroughly 
reviews the factual record regarding the numbers of students attending 
religious, community, and magnet schools, as well as the level of 
governmental support for each type of institution in determining whether 
parents truly had a choice of religious and nonreligious institutions at 
which to spend their voucher dollars.150  For Justice O’Connor, it was 
significant that the decision of the Court in Zelman was not a departure 
from precedent: “I do not believe that today’s decision, when considered 
in light of other longstanding government programs that impact religious 
organizations and our prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence, marks a 
dramatic break from the past.”151 
Just as Justice O’Connor had refused to join the conservative 
plurality in overruling Roe v. Wade, she also declined to overrule Lemon 
v. Kurtzman.152 
The year 2005 brought to the Court two cases challenging displays 
of the Ten Commandments on government property.  In Van Orden v. 
Perry153 the Court upheld the longstanding placement of a monolith in a 
park-like setting on the Capitol grounds in Austin, Texas,154 but in 
McCreary County, Kentucky v. A.C.L.U.,155 the Court struck down the 
order of the County Commissioners ordering the display of the Ten 
 
 147. 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding Cleveland school voucher program). 
 148. See id. at 643-48 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (describing school voucher program). 
 149. See id. at 663-76 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. at 663. 
 152. See id. at 668 (“Nor does today’s decision signal a major departure from this Court’s prior 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.”). 
 153. 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (upholding longstanding placement of Ten Commandments 
monolith on grounds of Texas Statehouse with other statuary dedicated to Texas history). 
 154. See id. at 2864 (Rehnquist, C.J.). 
Texas has treated her Capitol grounds monuments as representing the several strands in 
the State’s political and legal history. The inclusion of the Ten Commandments 
monument in this group has a dual significance, partaking of both religion and 
government. We cannot say that Texas’ display of this monument violates the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
Id. 
 155. 125 S. Ct.. 2722 (2005) (striking down order requiring displays of Ten Commandments in 
every public school building of County). 
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Commandments in every courthouse.156  Both cases were decided by a 
vote of 5-4, but for once Justice O’Connor was not the swing vote – 
Justice Breyer was.157  Justice O’Connor considered both displays of the 
Ten Commandments to be unconstitutional under the Establishment 
Clause because she believed that they were both erected for religious 
purposes, not for secular ones.158  Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
in McCreary County commences with one of the most eloquent 
discourses on religious freedom ever to have issued from the Court.  She 
stated: 
The First Amendment expresses our Nation’s fundamental 
commitment to religious liberty by means of two provisions—one 
protecting the free exercise of religion, the other barring establishment 
of religion. They were written by the descendents of people who had 
come to this land precisely so that they could practice their religion 
freely. Together with the other First Amendment guarantees—of free 
speech, a free press, and the rights to assemble and petition—the 
Religion Clauses were designed to safeguard the freedom of 
conscience and belief that those immigrants had sought. They embody 
an idea that was once considered radical: Free people are entitled to 
free and diverse thoughts, which government ought neither to constrain 
nor to direct. 
Reasonable minds can disagree about how to apply the Religion 
Clauses in a given case. But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to carry 
out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the fullest 
extent possible in a pluralistic society. By enforcing the Clauses, we 
have kept religion a matter for the individual conscience, not for the 
prosecutor or bureaucrat. At a time when we see around the world the 
violent consequences of the assumption of religious authority by 
government, Americans may count themselves fortunate: Our regard 
for constitutional boundaries has protected us from similar travails, 
 
 156. See id. at 2728-45 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Given the ample support for the District 
Court’s finding of a predominantly religious purpose behind the Counties’ third display, we affirm 
the Sixth Circuit in upholding the preliminary injunction.”). 
 157. See Van Orden, 125 S. Ct., at 2871 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“This case 
also differs from McCreary County, where the short (and stormy) history of the courthouse 
Commandments’ displays demonstrates the substantially religious objectives of those who mounted 
them, and the effect of this readily apparent objective upon those who view them.”). 
 158. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct., at 2747 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The purpose behind 
the counties’ display is relevant because it conveys an unmistakable message of endorsement to the 
reasonable observer.”); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct., at 1891 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“For 
essentially the reasons given by Justice Souter, as well as the reasons given in my concurrence in 
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union, I respectfully dissent.”) (citation omitted). 
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while allowing private religious exercise to flourish.159 
By steering a middle course on Establishment Clause questions, 
Justice O’Connor exemplified the ideal of government neutrality 
towards religion. 
E.  Procedural Due Process and the War on Terror 
One of the most significant decisions of the Supreme Court to date 
arising out of the War on Terror is Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.160  Hamdi, a 
United States citizen, allegedly fought for the Taliban before 
surrendering to Afghan forces.161  He was turned over to American 
authorities who confined him to a military brig in the United States, 
where he was held without trial as an “enemy combatant.”162  A petition 
for habeas corpus was filed on his behalf contending that he was being 
denied due process of law.163  A principal question before the Court 
concerned the procedure that would be used to determine the legality of 
his detention.164  Not surprisingly, Justice O’Connor steered a middle 
course among the justices.165 
 
 159. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2746 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 160. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (ruling that American citizen being held as an enemy combatant 
must be given meaningful opportunity to contest his detention). 
 161. See id. at 510 (O’Connor, J.). 
This case arises out of the detention of a man whom the Government alleges took up 
arms with the Taliban during this conflict. His name is Yaser Esam Hamdi. Born an 
American citizen in Louisiana in 1980, Hamdi moved with his family to Saudi Arabia as 
a child. By 2001, the parties agree, he resided in Afghanistan. At some point that year, he 
was seized by members of the Northern Alliance, a coalition of military groups opposed 
to the Taliban government, and eventually was turned over to the United States military. 
Id. 
 162. See id. at 510-11. 
In April 2002, upon learning that Hamdi is an American citizen, authorities transferred 
him to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, where he remained until a recent transfer to a 
brig in Charleston, South Carolina. The Government contends that Hamdi is an “enemy 
combatant,” and that this status justifies holding him in the United States indefinitely-
without formal charges or proceedings-unless and until it makes the determination that 
access to counsel or further process is warranted. 
Id. 
 163. See id. at 511 (“In June 2002, Hamdi’s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed the present 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .  It argues that, “[a]s an American citizen, Hamdi enjoys the 
full protections of the Constitution,” and that Hamdi’s detention in the United States without 
charges, access to an impartial tribunal, or assistance of counsel “violated and continue[s] to violate 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution”). 
 164. See id. at 524 (“Even in cases in which the detention of enemy combatants is legally 
authorized, there remains the question of what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who 
disputes his enemy-combatant status.”). 
 165. See id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
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Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, held that the detention 
and trial of suspected unlawful combatants was subject to constitutional 
dictates, but she ruled that the model of due process that had been 
established in Mathews v. Eldridge166 should govern the proceedings.167  
The Mathews test was developed in an administrative law setting, and it 
identified three factors to be balanced in determining “what process is 
due” under the Fifth Amendment – the strength of the private interest 
that the government was seeking to deprive the claimant of, the risk of 
error in the proceeding and the likelihood that the requested procedural 
safeguard would reduce the risk of error, and the strength of the 
governmental interest in withholding the procedural safeguard.168  In 
 
judgment) (joined by Justice Ginsberg) (ruling that Hamdi’s detention was not authorized by the 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, and stating, “If the Government raises nothing further than 
the record now shows, the Non-Detention Act entitles Hamdi to be released.”); id. at 554 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (joined by Justice Stevens). 
Where the Government accuses a citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional 
tradition has been to prosecute him in federal court for treason or some other crime. 
Where the exigencies of war prevent that, the Constitution’s Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 
9, cl. 2, allows Congress to relax the usual protections temporarily. Absent suspension, 
however, the Executive’s assertion of military exigency has not been thought sufficient 
to permit detention without charge. No one contends that the congressional 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, on which the Government relies to justify its 
actions here, is an implementation of the Suspension Clause. Accordingly, I would 
reverse the decision below. 
Id; see id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
The Executive Branch, acting pursuant to the powers vested in the President by the 
Constitution and with explicit congressional approval, has determined that Yaser Hamdi 
is an enemy combatant and should be detained. This detention falls squarely within the 
Federal Government’s war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-
guess that decision. 
Id. 
 166. 424 U.S. 319, (1976) (upholding administrative procedure for terminating eligibility for 
Social Security Disability). 
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. 
 167. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528-29 (O’Connor, J.) (“The ordinary mechanism that we use for 
balancing such serious competing interests, and for determining the procedures that are necessary to 
ensure that a citizen is not ‘deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,’ U.S. 
Const., Amend. 5, is the test that we articulated in Mathews.”) (citation omitted). 
 168. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35 (Powell, J.) (1976). 
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that 
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balancing these elements in Hamdi, Justice O’Connor concluded that 
detainees could be tried before military tribunals, that they might bear 
the burden of proving their innocence, and that hearsay evidence might 
be admitted against them.169 
Whether Justice O’Connor’s solution to trying detainees will stand 
the test of time is yet to be determined.  In my opinion, the United States 
has suffered incalculable moral and political damage arising from the 
Bush administration’s mistreatment of prisoners in the war on terror,170 
and it is as yet unclear whether or not Justice O’Connor’s “third way” of 
dealing with detainees will be sufficient to stem the mistreatment and 
restore the world’s faith that America is devoted to the rule of law.  I 
agree with the position taken by the four dissenting justices in Hamdi 
who argued that citizens such as Hamdi should be charged with crimes, 
not brought before military tribunals.171  On the other hand, Justice 
O’Connor’s compromise solution is more consistent with American 
ideals than kidnapping and “rendering” foreign citizens,172 torturing 
detainees,173 and developing a system of gulags around the world.174 
 
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. 
 169. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-34, 538 (O’Connor, J.). 
 170. See infra notes 172-74. 
 171. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Where the Government accuses a 
citizen of waging war against it, our constitutional tradition has been to prosecute him in federal 
court for treason or some other crime.”); see supra note 165 (citing dissenting opinions of Justice 
Scalia and Justice Souter). 
 172. See John Crewdson, CIA ‘Renditions’ of Terror Suspects Cause Furor in European 
Nations, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 30, 2005, at C4. 
The cases of Abu Omar, a radical Muslim snatched by the CIA under the noses of the 
Milan police and flown secretly to Egypt, and Khalid el-Masri, a German national 
forcibly transported by that same agency from Macedonia to an Afghan prison by 
mistake, have propelled what once seemed a settled debate over human rights to the 
center of the European political stage. 
It is difficult to name a Western European nation that has not announced some kind of 
investigation into whether the United States has been using its airports or airspace to 
ferry terrorist suspects to countries such as Egypt, Syria and Jordan for interrogations. 
Id. 
 173. See, e.g., Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, Pushing the Limits, TIME, Jan. 9, 2006, at 26. 
While insisting that the U.S. does not practice torture, the Administration fought a 
congressional effort to ban U.S. forces anywhere from “cruel, inhuman or degrading” 
treatment of detainees. That, plus an aborted Administration effort to limit the definition 
of torture to that which inflicts agony just short of the pain of organ failure or death, and 
photographic evidence that U.S. troops abused prisoners at Iraq’s Abu Ghraib prison, 
HUHN1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:08:56 PM 
2006] THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 405 
But there is one line from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hamdi 
that will be remembered and cited for generations.  She declared that “a 
state of war is not a blank check for the President. . . .”175  Indeed it is 
not, and we shall continue to depend upon the federal judiciary and 
above all the Supreme Court to safeguard our fundamental rights. 
F.  Federalism and Civil Rights 
Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law “the supreme 
law of the land” preempting state law,176 many questions of federal-state 
relations revolve around the scope of federal power.  The broader the 
scope of federal power, the narrower room there is for the exercise of 
state sovereignty.  As the only member of the current Supreme Court to 
have held elective office in state government,177 Justice O’Connor has a 
unique perspective on this matter and she has been a strong voice on the 
Court in favor of protecting state prerogatives.  On the other hand, she 
has also voted to uphold federal laws in some civil rights cases on the 
theory that federal protection of civil rights in some contexts outweighs 
the interests of the States.  Justice O’Connor’s stance on federalism can 
be summarized by describing the positions that she has carved out in a 
series of five dissenting opinions. 
The first of these dissenting opinions was handed down in F.E.R.C. 
v. Mississippi178 where Justice O’Connor objected to the ruling of the 
majority upholding a federal law imposing certain duties on state utility 
 
have created the image of a government tolerant of the practice. 
Id. 
 174. See id. 
It had already been made public that certain captured al-Qaeda leaders were held by the 
U.S. in undisclosed locations, but when the Washington Post reported in November that 
the CIA had kept suspected terrorists in secret prisons in as many as eight countries, 
including some in Eastern Europe, a global scandal erupted. 
Id. 
 175. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (O’Connor, J.). 
 176. U.S. Const. art. VI cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall 
be made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
 177. See The Justices of the Supreme Court, online at the official website of the United States 
Supreme Court, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last 
visited January 5, 2006) (“[O’Connor] was appointed to the Arizona State Senate in 1969 and was 
subsequently reelected to two two-year terms. In 1975 she was elected Judge of the Maricopa 
County Superior Court and served until 1979, when she was appointed to the Arizona Court of 
Appeals.”). 
 178. 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding provisions of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
against challenge under Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment). 
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regulators.  She stated: 
State legislative and administrative bodies are not field offices of the 
national bureaucracy. Nor are they think tanks to which Congress may 
assign problems for extended study. Instead, each State is sovereign 
within its own domain, governing its citizens and providing for their 
general welfare. While the Constitution and federal statutes define the 
boundaries of that domain, they do not harness state power for national 
purposes.179 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in F.E.R.C. foreshadowed her opinion 
for the Court in New York v. United States180 where she persuaded a 
majority of the Court to adopt the rule that Congress may not 
commandeer state officials in the enforcement of federal law.181  The 
principal policy reason offered by Justice O’Connor in support of this 
principle is the necessity for accountability in government: 
[W]here the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may 
be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while 
the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain 
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision. 
Accountability is thus diminished when, due to federal coercion, 
elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of 
the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.182 
The second significant dissenting opinion authored by Justice 
O’Connor on this topic came in 1985 in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority183 where she delivered an impassioned 
defense of federalism.  In that case the majority of the Court had upheld 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to a metropolitan 
transit authority, while Justice O’Connor and three other justices 
contended that Congress lacked authority to set minimum wages and 
maximum hours for state employees.  Although Justice O’Connor 
conceded that the Constitution did not expressly forbid the Congress 
from using its power under Commerce Clause to regulate entities of the 
State184 – she later characterized the Tenth Amendment as a 
 
 179. Id. at 777 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 180. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down the “take title” provision of the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985). 
 181. See id. at 162 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution has never been understood 
to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ 
instructions.”). 
 182. Id. at 169. 
 183. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 184. See id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The text of the Constitution does not define the 
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“tautology”185 – she asserted that the concept of state sovereignty was 
implicit in the spirit of the Constitution.186  From an examination of 
historical sources and previous cases, Justice O’Connor discerned that 
federalism was an important independent consideration in determining 
the scope of federal power.187  Although the Supreme Court has not 
overruled Garcia as Justice O’Connor had called for,188 in the “state 
sovereign immunity” cases the Court has essentially adopted Justice 
O’Connor’s vision of the source and the importance of the principle of 
 
precise scope of state authority other than to specify, in the Tenth Amendment, that the powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution are reserved to the States.”). 
 185. See New York, 505 U.S. at 156-57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not 
derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed, is 
essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the 
Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to 
the States. 
Id.  See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941) (Stone, J.).  The Court stated: 
The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been 
surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was more 
than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had 
been established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was other 
than to allay fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers not 
granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their reserved powers. 
Id. at 124. 
 186. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transp. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 585 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(“The spirit of the Tenth Amendment, of course, is that the States will retain their integrity in a 
system in which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme.”); id. at 588 (“It is 
insufficient, in assessing the validity of congressional regulation of a State pursuant to the 
commerce power, to ask only whether the same regulation would be valid if enforced against a 
private party. That reasoning, embodied in the majority opinion, is inconsistent with the spirit of our 
Constitution.”) 
 187. See id. at 586 (“[S]tate autonomy is a relevant factor in assessing the means by which 
Congress exercises its powers.”); id. at 588 (“[A]ll that stands between the remaining essentials of 
state sovereignty and Congress is the latter’s underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint.”).  “It is 
insufficient, in assessing the validity of congressional regulation of a State pursuant to the 
commerce power, to ask only whether the same regulation would be valid if enforced against a 
private party. That reasoning, embodied in the majority opinion, is inconsistent with the spirit of our 
Constitution.”  Id. 
 188. See id. at 589 (“I would not shirk the duty acknowledged by National League of Cities 
and its progeny, and I share Justice Rehnquist’s belief that this Court will in time again assume its 
constitutional responsibility.”); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 159 (O’Connor, J.). 
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether 
one views the question at issue in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the 
power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the 
Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the 
Tenth Amendment. Either way, we must determine whether any of the three challenged 
provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 
oversteps the boundary between federal and state authority. 
Id. 
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federalism.189 
The third dissenting opinion that reveals Justice O’Connor’s 
commitment to federalism was issued in South Dakota v. Dole,190 where 
the State had challenged a federal law requiring the States to adopt a 
minimum drinking age of twenty-one years old.  Under the federal law, 
States that failed to raise the minimum drinking age would suffer a five 
percent reduction in federal highway funds.  The majority of the Court in 
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist voted to uphold the federal law 
under the “conditional spending clause,” but Justice O’Connor argued 
that the federal law amounted to a regulation rather than a condition 
determining how the federal money was to be spent, and that it was 
therefore beyond Congress’ power under the Spending Clause to 
enact.191  This case demonstrates that Justice O’Connor’s commitment to 
federalism is at least as strong if not stronger than that of other members 
of the conservative bloc on the Court. 
The fourth of Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinions in the field of 
federalism was in response to the decision of the majority in City of 
Boerne v. Flores.192  In that case the majority developed a novel theory 
of Congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Court pled that any laws adopted by Congress pursuant to that 
provision of the Constitution must be congruent with the rights that are 
created under Section 1 of the Amendment and proportionate to any 
claimed violation of these rights that Congress is seeking to remedy or 
prevent.193  In other words, when Congress invokes its power to enact 
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment, it may protect existing 
rights, but may not create new ones.194  Applying this standard in 
 
 189. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (citing cases ruling that the principle of 
state sovereign immunity is implicit in the Constitution). 
 190. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding federal law conditioning states’ receipt of highway funds 
upon adoption of 21-year minimum drinking age). 
 191. Id. at 218 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
[A] condition that a State will raise its drinking age to 21 cannot fairly be said to be 
reasonably related to the expenditure of funds for highway construction. The only 
possible connection, highway safety, has nothing to do with how the funds Congress has 
appropriated are expended. Rather than a condition determining how federal highway 
money shall be expended, it is a regulation determining who shall be able to drink liquor. 
As such it is not justified by the spending power. 
Id. 
 192. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)). 
 193. See id. at 508 (Kennedy, J.) (“There must be a congruence and proportionality between 
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.”). 
 194. See id. (Kennedy, J.). 
The Amendment’s design and § 5’s text are inconsistent with any suggestion that 
Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Amendment’s restrictions on the 
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Boerne, the majority of the Court voted to strike down the federal 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.195  In a telling decision, Justice 
O’Connor agreed with the majority as to the standard for limiting 
Congressional power to enact legislation under the Enforcement 
Clause,196 but she disagreed with the majority’s limited understanding of 
the meaning of the right to Free Exercise of Religion.197  In this case, 
Justice O’Connor demonstrated that she is just as devoted to the 
principle of federalism as the other conservative justices, but that she is 
more devoted than they are to protecting fundamental rights. 
The position that Justice O’Connor took in Boerne explains her 
votes in another set of federalism cases.  Over the last decade the 
conservative majority, with Justice O’Connor supplying the necessary 
fifth vote, has resurrected the doctrine of “state sovereign immunity,” 
based loosely upon the language of the Eleventh Amendment.198  In a 
 
States. Legislation which alters the Free Exercise Clause’s meaning cannot be said to be 
enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what 
the right is. While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional 
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to 
discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the 
distinction exists and must be observed. 
Id. 
 195. See id. at 532 (“RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object 
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”). 
 196. See id. at 545 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, if I agreed with the Court’s standard in Smith I would join the opinion. As the 
Court’s careful and thorough historical analysis shows, Congress lacks the “power to 
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”  Rather, 
its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment extends only to enforcing the 
Amendment’s provisions. In short, Congress lacks the ability independently to define or 
expand the scope of constitutional rights by statute. Accordingly, whether Congress has 
exceeded its § 5 powers turns on whether there is a “congruence and proportionality 
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.” 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 197. See id. at 544-45. 
I remain of the view that Smith was wrongly decided, and I would use this case to 
reexamine the Court’s holding there. Therefore, I would direct the parties to brief the 
question whether Smith represents the correct understanding of the Free Exercise Clause 
and set the case for reargument. If the Court were to correct the misinterpretation of the 
Free Exercise Clause set forth in Smith it would simultaneously put our First 
Amendment jurisprudence back on course and allay the legitimate concerns of a majority 
in Congress who believed that Smith improperly restricted religious liberty. We would 
then be in a position to review RFRA in light of a proper interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
Id. 
 198. See Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese, & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for 
Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to “Fix” Florida Prepaid (and How Not to), 79 TEX. 
L. REV. 1037, 1046 (2001). ([T]he key to understanding state sovereign immunity doctrine is to 
HUHN1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:08:56 PM 
410 AKRON LAW REVIEW [39:373 
number of decisions, the Court has fashioned a rule that the principle of 
state sovereign immunity is implicit in the Constitution, thus making it 
unconstitutional for Congress to subject the States to civil suit for money 
damages when it acts pursuant to the Commerce Clause.199  However, 
this rule does not apply when Congress enacts legislation under the 
authority conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment perhaps 
because the Fourteenth Amendment controls over the Eleventh 
Amendment.200  Accordingly, in a number of cases it has been necessary 
for the Supreme Court to determine whether Congress was acting 
pursuant to the Commerce Clause or pursuant to Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment when it subjected the states to civil liability for 
money damages.201  In this line of cases, as in Boerne, Justice O’Connor 
has proven more likely than other members of the conservative majority 
to uphold Congressional legislation that is protective of civil rights.  In 
2003, she joined Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs202 upholding the federal 
 
realize that the Eleventh Amendment’s text actually has very little to do with it.”); id. (“The Court’s 
present majority thus views state sovereign immunity as a pre-constitutional principle, implicit in 
the constitutional structure, that bars suits against states for money damages.”). 
 199. See, e.g., College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expenses 
Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity precludes bank’s claim against 
state agency under federal Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that state sovereign immunity precludes Indian tribe’s suit 
against State to compel negotiations under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). 
 200. See id. at 1049-50 (proposing three reasons why state sovereign immunity does not apply 
when Congress acts pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).  The authors state: 
Some disagreement exists concerning why the Section Five power is special. One 
explanation asserts that the Reconstruction Amendments were broadly intended to create 
a general exception to federalism limitations on federal power. The Fitzpatrick Court, for 
example, explained that “[w]hen Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising 
legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional grant, it is 
exercising that authority under one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other 
sections by their own terms embody limitations on state authority.” 
A different account relies on the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was later in time 
than the Eleventh Amendment, and therefore “amends” the preceding amendment. 
Finally, one of us has argued more narrowly that Congress’s power to “enforce” federal 
rights should be understood, as a textual matter, to include the power to impose a 
damages remedy notwithstanding sovereign immunity. 
Id. at 1049-50 (footnotes omitted). 
 201. See Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding 
that state sovereignty immunity precludes claims for employment discrimination brought by 
disabled individual against the state university under federal Americans with Disabilities Act); 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that state sovereign immunity 
precludes claims for employment discrimination under federal Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act). 
 202. 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding provision of federal Family Medical Leave Act). 
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Family Medical Leave Act. The following year, she provided a crucial 
fifth vote to Justice Stevens in Tennessee v. Lane,203 upholding Title II 
of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to an individual 
who was denied reasonable access to the local courts. In both cases the 
Court upheld the federal laws as properly adopted pursuant to Congress’ 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore 
ruled that the civil damages remedies afforded by these laws were not 
foreclosed by the state sovereignty implications of the Eleventh 
Amendment.204 
The fifth important dissenting opinion authored by Justice 
O’Connor on federalism was handed down in 2005 in the “medical 
marijuana” case, Gonzales v. Raich.205  In that case the Supreme Court 
upheld the federal Controlled Substances Act as applied to persons 
growing and using marijuana for personal medical use.206  The State of 
California had legalized the use of marijuana for medical purposes, and 
the question before the Court was whether the State law was preempted 
by federal law.207  Justice O’Connor would have upheld the State statute 
on the ground that it was the prerogative of the State, not the federal 
government, to regulate the activity in question.208  She commenced her 
 
 203. 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding application of Title II of Americans with Disabilities 
Act). 
 204. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[T]he States’ record of unconstitutional 
participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits 
is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5 legislation.”); Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 
(Stevens, J.) (“[W]e find that Title II unquestionably is valid § 5 legislation as it applies to the class 
of cases implicating the accessibility of judicial services. . . .”). 
 205. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (upholding federal Controlled Substances Act as applied to 
persons growing and using marijuana for personal medical purposes against attack under Commerce 
Clause). 
 206. See id. at 2215 (Stevens, J.)  
[T]he case for the exemption comes down to the claim that a locally cultivated product 
that is used domestically rather than sold on the open market is not subject to federal 
regulation. Given the findings in the CSA and the undisputed magnitude of the 
commercial market for marijuana, our decisions in Wickard v. Filburn and the later cases 
endorsing its reasoning foreclose that claim. 
Id. 
 207. See id. at 2198-99. 
The question presented in this case is whether the power vested in Congress by Article I, 
§ 8, of the Constitution ‘[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution’ its authority to ‘regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States’ includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of 
marijuana in compliance with California law. 
Id. 
 208. See id. at 2229 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Relying on Congress’ abstract assertions, the Court has endorsed making it a federal 
crime to grow small amounts of marijuana in one’s own home for one’s own medicinal 
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opinion with these words: 
We enforce the “outer limits” of Congress’ Commerce Clause 
authority not for their own sake, but to protect historic spheres of state 
sovereignty from excessive federal encroachment and thereby to 
maintain the distribution of power fundamental to our federalist system 
of government. One of federalism’s chief virtues, of course, is that it 
promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that “a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and 
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”209 
In two previous Commerce Clause cases, Justice O’Connor had 
supplied a crucial fifth vote in favor of containing the power of Congress 
and thus preserving the power of the States.  She had voted with the 
majority in both United States v. Lopez,210 and United States v. 
Morrison,211 which struck down federal laws regulating gun possession 
and sexual assault in part because these activities have traditionally been 
regulated by the States.212  In these cases, the Court restricted Congress’ 
authority under the “affectation doctrine” to regulating activities which 
are “economic” in nature213 and the Court found that gun possession and 
 
use. This overreaching stifles an express choice by some States, concerned for the lives 
and liberties of their people, to regulate medical marijuana differently. If I were a 
California citizen, I would not have voted for the medical marijuana ballot initiative; if I 
were a California legislator I would not have supported the Compassionate Use Act. But 
whatever the wisdom of California’s experiment with medical marijuana, the federalism 
principles that have driven our Commerce Clause cases require that room for experiment 
be protected in this case. For these reasons I dissent. 
Id. 
 209. Id. at 2220 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) and N.L.R.B. v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) and quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 210. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down federal Guns Free School Zone Act as beyond 
Congress’ power to adopt under the Commerce Clause). 
 211. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down federal Violence Against Women Act as beyond 
Congress’ power to adopt under the Commerce Clause). 
 212. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557 (Rehnquist, C.J.) 
In Jones & Laughlin Steel the Court warned that the scope of the interstate commerce 
power “must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and may not be 
extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that 
to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the 
distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely centralized 
government. 
Id. (citation omitted); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (“The Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”). 
 213. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611 
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sexual assault were not economic in nature.214  A majority of the 
justices, however, have taken the position that the principal question 
before the Court in these cases was not whether the activity being 
regulated was “economic” or “noneconomic,” but rather whether the 
principle of federalism should operate as an affirmative check on the 
power of Congress to enforce the Commerce Clause.215  Similarly, 
Justice O’Connor’s analysis in Raich reveals that the principal reason 
that she believed that the federal law was unconstitutional in that case 
was because the people of the State of California had deliberately chosen 
to decriminalize the medical use of marijuana.  She stated: 
This case exemplifies the role of States as laboratories. The States’ 
core police powers have always included authority to define criminal 
 
(“Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have 
sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on 
interstate commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic endeavor.”). 
 214. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.. 
[The federal law] is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with 
“commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those 
terms. [It] is not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. It 
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that 
arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the 
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. 
Id. (footnote omitted); Morrison, 529 U.S. 617 (“We accordingly reject the argument that Congress 
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect 
on interstate commerce.”); see also Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2195 (Stevens, J.) (“Unlike those at issue in 
Lopez and Morrison, the activities regulated by the [Controlled Substances Act] are quintessentially 
economic.”). 
 215. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J, concurring) (joined by O’Connor, J.) (“This case 
requires us to consider our place in the design of the Government and to appreciate the significance 
of federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution.”); Morrison, 514 U.S. at 644-645 (Souter, 
J., dissenting) (joined by Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsberg, JJ.). 
If we now ask why the formalistic economic/noneconomic distinction might matter 
today, after its rejection in Wickard, the answer is not that the majority fails to see causal 
connections in an integrated economic world. The answer is that in the minds of the 
majority there is a new animating theory that makes categorical formalism seem useful 
again. Just as the old formalism had value in the service of an economic conception, the 
new one is useful in serving a conception of federalism. It is the instrument by which 
assertions of national power are to be limited in favor of preserving a supposedly 
discernible, proper sphere of state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the 
individual States see fit. The legitimacy of the Court’s current emphasis on the 
noncommercial nature of regulated activity, then, does not turn on any logic serving the 
text of the Commerce Clause or on the realism of the majority’s view of the national 
economy. The essential issue is rather the strength of the majority’s claim to have a 
constitutional warrant for its current conception of a federal relationship enforceable by 
this Court through limits on otherwise plenary commerce power. 
Id. 
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law and to protect the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens. 
Exercising those powers, California (by ballot initiative and then by 
legislative codification) has come to its own conclusion about the 
difficult and sensitive question of whether marijuana should be 
available to relieve severe pain and suffering.216 
Justice O’Connor took a similar position in the recently-decided 
case of Gonzales v. Oregon,217 in which she joined the majority of the 
Court in invalidating the “Ashcroft Directive,” an interpretive rule issued 
by the Attorney General which prohibited physicians from prescribing 
medications to assist a suicide.218 This federal directive had the effect of 
nullifying Oregon’s Death With Dignity Act,219 which legalized assisted 
suicide.220  One of the reasons given by the Court for deciding that the 
federal Controlled Substances Act does not authorize the Attorney 
General to issue this directive was because the directive interferes with 
the power of the States to regulate the practice of medicine, and 
therefore, violates principles of federalism.221 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Sandra Day O’Connor has performed her duties as Justice of the 
Supreme Court with dedication and vigor and she has contributed 
substantially to the development of American constitutional law.  She 
will be remembered as an extremely able justice and in future times her 
 
 216. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2221 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
      217.   126 S.Ct. 904 (2006) (holding that the federal Controlled Substances Act did not authorize 
the Attorney General to prohibit the use of regulated prescription drugs in assisted suicides as 
authorized by the Oregon Death With Dignity Act). 
      218.  See 66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (2001) (stating that “assisting suicide is not a ‘legitimate medical 
purpose’ within the meaning of 21 C.F.R. 1306.04 92001”), and that “prescribing, dispensing, or 
administering federally controlled substances to assist suicide violates the Controlled Substances 
Act”). 
      219.   OR.REV.STAT. § 127.800-897 (2003). 
      220.   OR.REV.STAT. § 127.805 (2003). 
An adult who is capable, is a resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the 
attending physician and consulting physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and 
who has voluntarily expressed his or her wish to die, may make a written request for 
medication for the purpose of ending his or her life in a humane and dignified manner . . .  
Id. 
      221.   Gonzalez, 126 S.Ct. at 923 (Kennedy, J.).  
[T]he [federal Controlled Substances Act] manifests no intent to regulate the practice of 
medicine generally. The silence is understandable given the structure and limitations of 
federalism, which allow the States “great latitude under their police powers to legislate 
as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.”  
Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 475 (1996), quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 
v. Massachusetts, 471 U. S. 724, 756 (1985)).  
HUHN1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:08:56 PM 
2006] THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 415 
name will also be linked with that of Thurgood Marshall for having 
integrated the Supreme Court. 
Perhaps Justice O’Connor’s greatest contribution to our 
jurisprudence and to our lives has been, in her own words, her refusal to 
“foreclose the unanticipated.”222  She values both precedent and 
tradition, but in deciding the cases that have come before her she has not 
blindly followed either.  Instead she has helped to articulate precisely 
when a justice of the Supreme Court is justified in overruling precedent 
and she has helped to distinguish valued traditions which must be 
followed from discredited traditions which should be discarded.  She 
carefully reviewed the facts of every case with new eyes, she thoroughly 
examined the multiple factors that might be relevant to every legal 
determination, and she thoughtfully considered the continued vitality of 
received doctrine and the authoritative weight to be given to the sources 
of law that create doctrine.  Over the course of her career she turned her 
attention from the consideration of the technicalities of appellate process 
to the articulation of fundamental American values, and as she did so she 
became an eloquent writer.  In all of these ways, Justice O’Connor has 
exhibited an impressive level of open-mindedness and capacity for 
growth. 
 
          222.    Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989). 
